We study individual rational, Pareto-optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. We consider settings with multiunit demand and additive valuations. For single-dimensional valuations we prove a positive result for randomized mechanisms, and a negative result for deterministic mechanisms. While the positive result allows for private budgets, the negative result is for public budgets. For multidimensional valuations and public budgets we prove an impossibility result that applies to deterministic and randomized mechanisms. Taken together this shows the power of randomization in certain settings with heterogeneous items, but it also shows its limitations.
INTRODUCTION
A canonical problem in mechanism design is the design of economically efficient auctions that satisfy individual rationality and incentive compatibility. When utilities are quasilinear these goals are achieved by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. In many practical situations, including settings in which the agents have budget limits, quasilinearity is violated and, thus, the VCG mechanism is not applicable. Ausubel [2004] describes an ascending-bid auction for homogeneous items that yields the same outcome as the sealed-bid Vickrey auction, but offers advantages in terms of simplicity, transparency, and privacy preservation. In his concluding remarks he points out that "when budgets impair the bidding of true valuations in a sealed-bid Vickrey auction, a dynamic auction may facilitate the expression of true valuations while staying within budget limits" (p. 1469). Dobzinski et al. [2012] show that an adaptive version of Ausubel's "clinching auction" is indeed the unique mechanism that satisfies individual rationality, Pareto optimality, and incentive compatibility in settings with public budgets. They use this fact to show that there can be no mechanism that achieves those properties for private budgets. An important restriction of Dobzinski et al.' s impossibility result for private budgets is that it only applies to deterministic mechanisms. In fact, as Bhattacharya et al. [2010] show, there exists a randomized mechanism for homogeneous items that is individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible with private budgets.
As Ausubel [2006] points out, "situations abound in diverse industries in which heterogeneous (but related) commodities are auctioned" (p. 602). He also describes an ascending-bid auction, the "crediting and debiting auction," that takes the place of the "clinching auction" when items are heterogeneous. Positive and negative results for deterministic mechanisms and public budgets that apply to heterogeneous items are given in Fiat et al. [2011] , Lavi and May [2012] , Goel et al. [2012] , and Colini-Baldeschi et al. [2012] . We focus on randomized mechanisms for heterogeneous items, and prove positive results for private budgets and negative results for public budgets. We thus explore the power and limitations of randomization in this setting.
Our Contribution
We analyze two settings with heterogeneous items and additive valuations. In the first setting the valuations are single dimensional in that each agent has a valuation, each item has a quality, and an agent's valuation for an item is the product of the item's quality and the agent's valuation. 1 In the second setting, the valuations are multidimensional in that each agent has an arbitrary, nonnegative valuation for each item. In both cases we analyze whether a deterministic or randomized mechanism exists that satisfies Individual Rationality (IR), Pareto Optimality (PO), and Incentive Compatibility (IC). For both types of mechanisms we distinguish between settings with public budgets and settings with private budgets. For randomized mechanisms the corresponding properties can either be satisfied ex interim or they can be satisfied ex post. The former requires that the property is satisfied in expectation over the outcomes the randomized mechanism produces, while the latter requires that it is satisfied by every possible outcome of the mechanism.
(a) For single-dimensional valuations we present a deterministic mechanism for divisible items that is IR, PO, and IC with public budgets and a randomized mechanism for both divisible and indivisible items that is IR ex interim, PO ex post, and IC ex interim with private budgets. These mechanisms also satisfy another desirable property, namely, "No Positive Transfers" (NPT), which requires that the individual payments are nonnegative. We obtain these mechanisms through a general reduction from the setting with multiple, heterogeneous items to the setting of a single and, by definition, homogeneous item. This allows us to apply the mechanisms for this setting presented in Bhattacharya et al. [2010] . The main difficulty in showing that the resulting deterministic and randomized mechanisms for multiple items have the desired properties is to show that they satisfy PO (PO ex post, respectively). For this we 1 Such valuations arise whenever the agents agree about the relative values of the items. One concrete example is an auction in which display ads are sold in bulks consisting of a certain number of impressions together with per-impression valuations. Another example is auctions in which display ads of different size are sold and the valuations are proportional to size. In both cases the respective per-item valuations are the product of the item's quality, either the number of impressions or the size, and the agent's valuation, either per impression or per pixel. argue that the reduction preserves a certain structural property of the mechanisms for a single item. We connect this structural property to a novel "No Trade" (NT) condition, and show that it is equivalent to PO (PO ex post, respectively).
(b) For single-dimensional valuations the impossibility result of Dobzinski et al. [2012] implies that there can be no deterministic mechanism for indivisible items that is IR, PO, and IC for private budgets. We show that for heterogeneous items there can also be no deterministic mechanism for indivisible items that is IR, PO, and IC for public budgets. To this end, we extend the "classic" result that IC mechanisms must satisfy "Value Monotonicity" (VM) and "Payment Identity" (PI) from settings without budgets to settings with public budgets. To establish the impossibility result, we then use NT and PI to derive a lower bound on the payments that conflicts with the upper bounds on the payments required by IR. Our impossibility result is tight in the sense that if any of the conditions is relaxed such a mechanism exists: (i) For homogeneous, indivisible items a deterministic mechanism is given by Dobzinski et al. [2012] . (ii) For heterogeneous items we give a deterministic mechanism for divisible and a randomized mechanism for indivisible items as described previously. We thus obtain a strong separation between deterministic mechanisms, which do not exist for public budgets, and randomized mechanisms, which exist for private budgets. This separation is stronger than in the homogeneous items setting, where a deterministic mechanism exists for public budgets.
(c) For multidimensional valuations the impossibility result of Fiat et al. [2011] implies that there can be no deterministic mechanism for indivisible items that is IR, PO, and IC for public budgets. We show that there can also be no deterministic mechanism with these properties for divisible items. To prove this we observe that-just as in settings without budgets-every mechanism that satisfies IC with public budgets must satisfy "Weak Monotonicity" (WMON). Then we show that in certain settings this condition will be violated. For this we use that multidimensional valuations enable the agents to manipulate in a sophisticated manner. While all previous impossibility results in this area used agents that either only overstate or only understate their valuations, we use an agent that overstates his valuation for some item and understates his valuation for another item. We use our impossibility result for deterministic mechanisms to show that for both divisible and indivisible items there can be no randomized mechanism that is IR ex interim, PO ex interim, and IC ex interim with public budgets. This is the first impossibility result for randomized mechanisms in this domain. It also establishes an interesting separation between multidimensional valuations, where no such mechanism exists, and single-dimensional valuations, where such a mechanism exists.
Related Work
Homogeneous items were studied by Dobzinski et al. [2012] , Bhattacharya et al. [2010] , and Lavi and May [2012] . Dobzinski et al. show that for both divisible and indivisible items there is a deterministic mechanism that is IR, PO, and IC with public budgets, and that no deterministic mechanisms can achieve this with private budgets. Bhattacharya et al. show that there is a randomized mechanism for both divisible and indivisible items that is IR ex interim, PO ex post, NPT ex post, and IC ex interim with private budgets. Lavi and May prove an impossibility result for nonadditive valuations with decreasing marginals. The impossibility result of Dobzinski et al. applies to both of our settings, but our impossibility results are stronger as they are for public budgets and, in the case of multidimensional valuations, also apply to randomized mechanisms. The positive results of Dobzinski et al. and Bhattacharya et al. do not apply to our settings as we study heterogeneous items, not homogeneous items. The impossibility result of Lavi and May does not apply to our settings as the valuations that we study are additive. ) . A plus (+ or ⊕) indicates a positive result, and a minus (− or ) indicates a negative result. We use + and − for results from the related work with abbreviated references in brackets, and ⊕ and for results from this article. A question mark (?) indicates that nothing is known for this setting. For the model with interest sets the table has two entries: one for public and one for private interest sets.
Heterogeneous items were first studied by Fiat et al. [2011] . In their model each agent has the same valuation for each item in an agent-dependent interest set and zero for all other items. They give a deterministic mechanism for indivisible items that satisfies IR, NPT, PO, and IC when both interest sets and budgets are public. They also show that when the interest sets are private, then there can be no deterministic mechanism that satisfies IR, PO, and IC. The positive result of Fiat et al. does not apply to our settings as it is not always possible to express the valuations that we consider in terms of per-agent valuations and interest sets. The impossibility result of Fiat et al. applies to our multidimensional setting and shows that there can be no deterministic mechanism that satisfies IR, PO, and IC with public budgets for indivisible items. Our impossibility result for this setting is stronger as it also applies to randomized mechanisms and divisible items.
Settings with heterogeneous items were subsequently, and in parallel to this article, studied by Colini-Baldeschi et al. [2012] and Goel et al. [2012] . The former study problems in which the agents are interested in a certain number of slots for each of a set of keywords. The slots are associated with click-through rates that are assumed to be identical across keywords. The latter study settings in which the agents have identical valuations per item but the allocations must satisfy polyhedral or polymatroidal constraints. The settings studied in these papers are more general than the single-dimensional valuations setting studied here. On the one hand, this implies that our impossibility result for this setting applies to their settings, showing that in their settings there can be no deterministic mechanism for indivisible items that is IC with public budgets. On the other hand, this implies that their positive results apply to our setting. This shows the existence of deterministic mechanisms for divisible items and randomized mechanisms for both divisible and indivisible items that are IC with public budgets in our setting. Our positive result for this setting is stronger as it shows the existence of a mechanism that is IC with private budgets. Finally, the impossibility results of Colini-Baldeschi et al. and Goel et al. either assume nonadditive valuations or that the allocations satisfy arbitrary polyhedral constraints and therefore do not apply to the multidimensional valuations setting that we study here.
We summarize the results from this article and the related work along with open problems in Figure 1 .
PROBLEM STATEMENT
We are given a set N of n agents and a set M of m items. We distinguish between settings with divisible items and settings with indivisible items. In both settings we use X = n i=1 X i for the allocation space. For divisible items X i = [0, 1] m for all agents i ∈ N and x i, j ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of item j ∈ M that is allocated to agent i ∈ N. For indivisible items X i = {0, 1} m for all agents i ∈ N and x i, j ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether item j ∈ M is allocated to agent i ∈ N or not. In both cases, we require that n i=1 x i, j ≤ 1 for all items j ∈ M. We do not require that m j=1 x i, j ≤ 1 for all agents i ∈ N, that is, we do not assume that the agents have unit demand.
Each agent i has a type θ i = (v i , b i ) consisting of a valuation function v i : X i → R ≥0 and a budget b i ∈ R ≥0 . We use = n i=1 i for the type space. We consider two settings with heterogeneous items, one with multi-and one with single-dimensional valuations. In the first setting, each agent i ∈ N has a valuation v i, j ∈ R ≥0 for each item j ∈ M and agent i's valuation for allocation
For simplicity, we will assume that in this setting α 1 > α 2 > · · · > α m and that v 1 > v 2 > · · · > v n > 0.
A (direct) mechanism M = (x, p) consisting of an allocation rule x : → X and a payment rule p : → R n is used to compute an outcome (x, p) consisting of an allocation x ∈ X and payments p ∈ R n . A mechanism is deterministic if the computation of (x, p) is deterministic, and it is randomized if the computation of (x, p) is randomized. We allow the resulting allocation and payments to be arbitrarily correlated.
We assume that the agents are utility maximizers and as such need not report their types truthfully. We consider settings in which both the valuations and budgets are private and settings in which only the valuations are private and the budgets are public. When the budgets are public, then they are known to the auctioneer and all agents. Private valuations/budgets mean that only the agent itself knows its valuation/budget, but not the other agents or the auctioneer. In the private values and private budgets, setting a report by agent i ∈ N with true type
In the private values but public budgets, setting agent i ∈ N is restricted to reports of the form θ i = (v i , b i ). In both settings, if mechanism M = (x, p) is used to compute an outcome for reported types θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) and the true types are θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ), then the utility of agent i ∈ N is
For deterministic mechanisms and their outcomes we are interested in the following properties:
(a) IR: A mechanism is IR if it always produces an IR outcome. An outcome (x, p) for
with at least one of the inequalities strict. 2 Note that we do not explicitly require that the alternate outcome is IR, but that only IR outcomes can dominate an IR outcome. That means that if we consider a PO and IR outcome, then the two definitions are actually equivalent.
(c) NPT: A mechanism satisfies NPT if it always produces an NPT outcome. An outcome (x, p) satisfies NPT if p i ≥ 0 for all agents i ∈ N.
(d) IC: A mechanism satisfies IC if for all agents i ∈ N, all true types θ , and all reported types θ we have
For randomized mechanisms, we are naturally interested in randomized outcomes, which are distributions over deterministic ones. We then consider the expected utility an agent gets and compare it to the expected utility that the agent could get with other randomized outcomes. If a randomized outcome satisfies the preceding conditions in this way, we say it satisfies them ex interim. Alternatively, if each deterministic outcome in support of a randomized outcome has this property, we say it satisfies the property ex post. For outcomes that are IR ex interim and PO ex interim, only outcomes that are IR ex interim can be better. Hence, our negative results for randomized mechanisms also apply under this alternate definition.
SINGLE-DIMENSIONAL VALUATIONS
In this section, we present exact characterizations of PO (PO ex post, respectively) outcomes and deterministic mechanisms that are IC with public budgets. We characterize PO (PO ex post, respectively) by a simpler "no trade" condition and extend the "classic" characterization results for deterministic mechanisms for single-dimensional valuations (see, e.g., Myerson [1981] and Archer and Tardos [2001] ) that are IC without budgets to settings with public budgets. We then show our main positive result, that is, the existence of randomized mechanisms for divisible and indivisible items that are IR ex interim, PO ex post, and IC ex interim for private budgets. We complement this positive result with an impossibility result for deterministic mechanisms for indivisible items that applies even when budgets are public.
Exact Characterizations of Pareto Optimality and Incentive Compatibility
We start by characterizing PO (PO ex post, respectively) outcomes through a simpler "no trade" condition. In the deterministic setting, we consider an outcome (x, p) and compare it to alternate allocations x . In the randomized setting, we consider a deterministic outcome and compare it to possibly randomized allocations x . In what follows, we use x i, j to denote the expected fraction of item j agent i gets. This allows us to treat the two settings in a unified manner.
We say that an outcome (x, p) for single-dimensional valuations satisfies NT if (a) i∈N x i, j = 1 for all j ∈ M, and (b) there is no allocation x such that for
The quantity δ i v i is how much valuation agent i gains/loses when switching from allocation x to x . The agents in W are "winners," while the agents in L are "losers." Winners are willing to increase their payment by at most min
The definition says that there should be no alternative assignment that strictly increases the sum of the valuations and allows the winners to compensate the losers.
Here is an example: Consider a setting with two agents and a single indivisible item. Suppose that the agents have valuations 10 and 5 and budgets 6 and 4. Then the outcome (x, p), which gives the item to agent 2 at a price of 4, does not satisfy NT. This is because the alternate allocation x , which gives the item to agent 1, has δ 1 v 1 = 1 · 10 = 10 and δ 2 v 2 = −1 · 5 = −5 and thus i∈N δ i v i > 0. Moreover, W = {1} and L = {2} and i∈W min(b i − p i , δ i v i ) + i∈L δ i v i = min(6, 10) − 5 ≥ 0. Indeed, we could reassign the item from agent 2 to agent 1, increase agent 1's payment by 5, and decrease agent 2's payment by 5. In the resulting outcome, agent 1 would have a strictly higher utility, agent 2's utility would be unchanged, and the sum of payments would increase by 1. Hence, the original outcome was not PO. Next, we characterize deterministic mechanisms for indivisible items that are IC with public budgets by "value monotonicity" and "payment identity." A deterministic mechanism M = (x, p) for single-dimensional valuations and indivisible items that respects the publicly known budgets satisfies VM if for all i ∈ N,
for single-dimensional valuations and indivisible items that respects the publicly known budgets satisfies PI if for all i ∈ N and
are the values j∈M x i, j α j can take and c γ s (b i , θ −i ) for 1 ≤ s ≤ t are the corresponding critical valuations. While VM ensures that stating a higher valuation can only lead to a better allocation, PI gives a formula for the payment in terms of the possible allocations and the critical valuations. PROPOSITION 3.2. A deterministic mechanism M = (x, p) for single-dimensional valuations and indivisible items that respects the publicly known budgets is IC if and only if it satisfies VM and PI.
Randomized Mechanisms for Indivisible and Divisible Items
We obtain our positive result through a reduction to the setting with a single (and thus, homogeneous) item that allows us to apply the following proposition from Bhattacharya et al. [2010] . The basic building block of the mechanisms mentioned in this proposition is the "adaptive clinching auction" for a single divisible item. It is described for two agents in Dobzinski et al. [2012] and as a "continuous time process" for arbitrarily many agents in Bhattacharya et al. [2010] . . For a single divisible item there exists a deterministic mechanism that satisfies IR, NPT, PO, and IC for public budgets. Additionally, for a single divisible or indivisible item there exists a randomized mechanism that satisfies IR ex interim, NPT ex post, PO ex post, and IC ex interim for private budgets.
For indivisible items we reduce the multi-item to the single-item setting by applying the randomized mechanism for a single indivisible item of Bhattacharya et al. [2010] to a single indivisible item for which agent i ∈ N has valuationṽ i = j∈M α j v i . We then map the single-item outcome (x,p) into an outcome (x, p) for the multi-item setting by setting x i, j = 1 for all j ∈ M if and only ifx i = 1 and setting p i =p i for all i ∈ N.
A similar reduction works in the case of divisible items. The only difference is that in this case we use the deterministic or randomized mechanisms of Bhattacharya et al. [2010] for a single divisible item, and then map the single-item outcome (x,p) into a multi-item outcome by setting x i, j =x i for all i ∈ N and all j ∈ M and setting p i =p i for all i ∈ N.
The main difficulty in proving that the resulting mechanisms have the claimed properties is to establish that they are PO/PO ex post. For this we argue that these particular ways of mapping the single-item outcome into a multi-item outcome preserves a specific structural property of the single-item outcome that remains to be sufficient for PO/PO ex post also in the multi-item setting. PROPOSITION 3.4. For indivisible or divisible items, if (x,p) denotes the randomized outcome for a single item of the randomized mechanism of Bhattacharya et al. [2010] and (x,p) denotes the randomized outcome for the multi-item setting constructed as described previously, then
Similarly, for divisible items, if (x,p) denotes the deterministic outcome for a single item of the deterministic mechanism of Bhattacharya et al. [2010] and (x,p) denotes the deterministic outcome for the multi-item setting constructed as described previously, then u i (
THEOREM 3.5. For single-dimensional valuations, divisible or indivisible items, and private budgets there is a randomized mechanism that satisfies IR ex interim, NPT ex post, PO ex post, and IC ex interim. Additionally, for single-dimensional valuations and divisible items there is a deterministic mechanism that satisfies IR, NPT, PO, and IC for public budgets.
PROOF. IR (IR ex interim, respectively) and IC (IC ex interim, respectively) follow from Proposition 3.4 and the fact that the corresponding mechanisms of Bhattacharya et al. [2010] are IR (IR ex interim, respectively) and IC (IC ex interim, respectively). NPT (NPT ex post, respectively) follows from the fact that the payments in our mechanisms and the mechanisms of Bhattacharya et al. [2010] are the same, and the mechanisms in Bhattacharya et al. [2010] satisfy NPT (NPT ex post, respectively). For PO (ex post) we argue that the structural property of the outcomes of the mechanisms in Bhattacharya et al. [2010] that (a) i∈Nx i, j = 1 for all j ∈ M and (b) j∈Mx i, j > 0 andṽ i >ṽ i implyp i = b i (both ex post) is preserved by the mapping to the multi-item setting and remains to be sufficient for PO (ex post).
We first show that the property is preserved. For this, observe that i∈Nx i, j = 1 for all j ∈ M implies that i∈N x i, j = 1 for all j ∈ M and that j∈Mx i, j > 0 andṽ i >ṽ i implyp i = b i implies that j∈M x i, j > 0 and v i > v i imply p i = b i .
Next, we show that the property remains to be sufficient for PO (ex post). For this, assume by contradiction that the outcome (x, p) is not PO (ex post). Then, by Proposition 3.1, there exists a (possibly randomized) x such that i∈N δ i v i > 0 and
Because (x, p) satisfies condition (a), that is, i∈N x i, j = 1 for all j ∈ M, and x is a valid assignment, that is,
We complete the proof by distinguishing three cases, and showing that in each of the three cases we get a contradiction.
Case 1: t = n. Then, i∈W min(
Case 3: t < n and W ∩ {1, . . . , t} = ∅. Then, i∈W min( Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits 4:9
Deterministic Mechanisms for Indivisible Items
The proof of our impossibility result uses the characterizations of PO outcomes and mechanisms that are IC with public budgets as follows: (a) PO is characterized by NT and NT induces a lower bound on the agents' payments for a specific assignment, namely, for the case that agent 1 only gets item m. (b) IC, in turn, is characterized by VM and PI. Now, VM and PI can be used to extend the lower bound on the payments for the specific assignment to all possible assignments. (c) Finally, IR implies upper bounds on the payments that, with a suitable choice of valuations, conflict with the lower bounds on the payments induced by NT, VM, and PI. THEOREM 3.6. For single-dimensional valuations, indivisible items, and public budgets there can be no deterministic mechanism M = (x, p) that satisfies IR, PO, and IC.
PROOF. For a contradiction suppose that there is a mechanism M = (x, p) that is IR, PO, and IC for all n and all m. Consider a setting with n = 2 agents and m = 2 items in which v 1 > v 2 > 0 and b 1 > α 1 v 2 .
Observe that if agent 1's valuation was v 1 = 0 and he reported his valuation truthfully, then since M satisfies IR his utility would be u 1 ((0, b 1 
By PO, which by Proposition 3.1 is characterized by NT, agent 1 with valuation v 1 > v 2 and budget b 1 > α 1 v 2 must win at least one item because otherwise he could buy any item from agent 2 and compensate him for his loss.
PO, respectively NT, also implies that agent 1's payment for item 2 must be strictly larger than b 1 − (α 1 − α 2 )v 2 because otherwise he could trade item 2 against item 1 and compensate agent 2 for his loss.
By IC, which by Proposition 3.2 is characterized by VM and PI, agent 1's payment for item 2 is given by p 1 ({2}) = p 1 ((0, b 1 ), θ −1 ) + α 2 c α 2 (b 1 , θ −1 ), where c α 2 is the critical valuation for winning item 2. Together with p 1 ({2} 
IC (VM and PI, respectively), also imply that agent 1's payment for any nonempty set of items S in terms of the fractions γ t = j∈S α j > · · · > γ 1 = α 2 > γ 0 = 0 and corresponding critical valuations
Combining this lower bound on p 1 (S) with the lower bound on c α 2 (b 1 , θ −1 ) shows that
For v 1 such that (1/α 2 )[b 1 − (α 1 − α 2 )v 2 ] > v 1 > v 2 , we know that agent 1 must win some item, but for any nonempty set of items S the lower bound on agent 1's payment for S contradicts IR.
MULTIDIMENSIONAL VALUATIONS
In this section, we obtain a partial characterization of deterministic mechanisms that are IC with public budgets by generalizing the "weak monotonicity" condition of Bikhchandani et al. [2006] from settings without budgets to settings with budgets. We use this partial characterization together with a sophisticated misreport, in which an agent understates his valuation for some item and overstates his valuation for another item, to prove that there can be no deterministic mechanism for divisible items that is IR, PO, and IC with public budgets. Afterward, we use this result to show that there can be no randomized mechanism for either divisible or indivisible items that is IR ex interim, PO ex interim, and IC ex interim for public budgets.
Partial Characterization of Incentive Compatibility
For settings without budgets, every deterministic mechanism that is incentive compatible must satisfy what is known as WMON, namely, if x i and x i are the assignments of agent i for reports v i and v i , then the difference in the valuations for the two assignments must be at least as large under v i as under
). We show that this is also true for deterministic mechanisms that respect the public budgets. PROPOSITION 4.1. If a deterministic mechanism M = (x, p) for multidimensional valuations and either divisible or indivisible items that respects the publicly known budget limits is IC, then it satisfies WMON.
Deterministic Mechanisms for Divisible Items
We prove the impossibility result by analyzing a setting with two agents and two items. This restriction is without loss of generality as the impossibility result for an arbitrary number of agents n > 2 and an arbitrary number of items m > 2 follows by setting v i, j = 0 if i > 2 or j > 2. In our impossibility proof agent 2 is not budget restricted (i.e., b 2 > v 2,1 + v 2,2 ). Agents can misreport their valuations, and it is not sufficient to study a single input to prove the impossibility. Hence, we study the outcome for three related cases, namely, Case 1 where v 1,1 < v 2,1 and v 1,2 < v 2,2 ; Case 2 where v 1,1 > v 2,1 , v 1,2 < v 2,2 , and b 1 > v 1,1 ; and Case 3 where v 1,1 > v 2,1 , v 1,2 > v 2,2 , and additionally, b 1 > v 1,1 , v 1,1 v 2,2 > v 1,2 v 2,1 , and v 2,1 + v 2,2 > b 1 . We give a partial characterization of those cases, which allows us to analyze the rational behavior of the agents.
Case 1 is easy: Agent 2 is not budget restricted and has the highest valuations for both items; so he will get both items. Thus, in this case, the utility for agent 1 is zero.
LEMMA 4.2 (CASE 1). Given b 2 > v 2,1 + v 2,2 , v 2,1 > v 1,1 and v 2,2 > v 1,2 , then x 1,1 = 0, x 1,2 = 0, x 2,1 = 1, x 2,2 = 1, and u 1 = 0 in every IR and PO outcome selected by an IC mechanism.
In Case 2, agent 1 has the higher valuation for item 1, while agent 2 has the higher valuation for item 2. Thus, agent 1 gets item 1 and agent 2 gets item 2. Since the only difference to Case 1 is that in Case 2 v 1,1 > v 2,1 while in Case 1 v 1,1 < v 2,1 , the critical value whether agent 2 gets item 1 or not is v 2,1 , and thus in every IC mechanism, agent 1 has to pay v 2,1 and his utility is v 1,1 − v 2,1 . LEMMA 4.3 (CASE 2). Given b 2 > v 2,1 + v 2,2 , v 1,1 > v 2,1 , v 2,2 > v 1,2 , and b 1 > v 1,1 , then x 1,1 = 1, x 1,2 = 0, x 2,1 = 0, x 2,2 = 1, and u 1 = v 1,1 − v 2,1 in every IR and PO outcome selected by an IC mechanism.
In Case 3, agent 1 has a higher valuation than agent 2 for both items, but he does not have enough budget to pay for both fully. In Lemma 4.4 we show that if agent 1 does not spend his whole budget ( p 1 < b 1 ) he must fully receive both items (specifically x 1,2 = 1), since if not, he would buy more of them. Additionally, even if he spent his budget fully (i.e., p 1 = b 1 ) his utility u i , which equals x 1,1 v 1,1 + x 1,2 v 1,2 − b 1 , must be nonnegative. Since b 1 > v 1,1 this implies that x 1,1 must be 1, that is, he must receive item 1 fully, and x 1,2 must be nonzero. Then, in Lemma 4.5, we show that actually x 1,2 < 1, which, combined with Lemma 4.4, implies that p 1 = b 1 . The fact that x 1,2 < 1, that is, that agent 1 does not fully get item 1 and 2 is not surprising since he does not have enough budget to outbid agent 2 on both items as b 1 < v 2,1 + v 2,2 . However, we are even able to determine the exact value of x 1,2 , which is (b 1 − v 2,1 )/v 2,2 . LEMMA 4.4 (CASE 3, PART A). Given v 1,1 > v 2,1 , v 1,2 > v 2,2 , b 1 > v 1,1 , and v 1,1 v 2,2 > v 1,2 v 2,1 , if p 1 < b 1 , then x 1,1 = 1 and x 1,2 = 1, else if p 1 = b 1 , then x 1,1 = 1 and x 1,2 > 0, in every IR and PO outcome.
LEMMA 4.5 (CASE 3, PART B). Given b 2 > v 2,1 + v 2,2 , v 1,1 > v 2,1 , v 1,2 > v 2,2 , b 1 > v 1,1 ,  v 1,1 v 2,2 > v 1,2 v 2,1 , and v 2,1 + v 2,2 > b 1 , then p 1 = b 1 and x 1,2 = (b 1 − v 2,1 ) /v 2,2 < 1 in every IR and PO outcome selected by an IC mechanism.
We combine these characterizations of Case 3 with (a) the WMON property shown in Proposition 4.1 and (b) a sophisticated way of agent 2 to misreport: He overstates his value for item 1 by a value α and understates his value for item 2 by a value 0 < β < α, but by such small values that Case 3 continues to hold. Thus, by Lemma 4.4 x 2,1 remains 0 (whether agent 2 misreports or does not), and thus, the WMON condition implies that x 2,2 does not increase. However, by the dependence of x 1,2 on v 2,1 and v 2,2 shown in Lemma 4.5, x 1,2 , and thus also x 2,2 changes when agent 2 misreports. This gives a contradiction to the assumption that such a mechanism exists. THEOREM 4.6. There is no deterministic IC mechanism for divisible items which selects for any given input with public budgets an IR and PO outcome.
PROOF. Let us assume by contradiction that such a mechanism exists and consider an input for which b 2 > v 2,1 + v 2,2 , v 1,1 > v 2,1 , v 1,2 > v 2,2 , b 1 > v 1,1 , v 1,1 v 2,2 > v 1,2 v 2,1 , and v 2,1 + v 2,2 > b 1 holds. Such an input exists; for example, v 1,1 = 4, v 1,2 = 5, v 2,1 = 3, and v 2,2 = 4 with budgets b 1 = 5 and b 2 = 8 would be such an input. Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 imply that x 1,1 = 1, x 2,1 = 0, x 1,2 = b 1 −v 2,1 v 2,2 , x 2,2 = 1 − x 1,2 , and p 1 = b 1 . Let us consider an alternative valuation by agent 2. We define v 2,1 = v 2,1 +α and v 2,2 = v 2,2 −β for arbitrary α, β > 0 and α > β, which are sufficiently small such that v 1,1 v 2,2 > v 1,2 v 2,1 holds, and we denote the fraction of item 2 assigned to agent 2 for the alternated valuations by x 2,2 . By Proposition 4.1, IC implies WMON, and therefore, x 2,2 v 2,2 − x 2,2 v 2,2 ≥ x 2,2 v 2,2 − x 2,2 v 2,2 .
It follows that x 2,2 ≥ x 2,2 , and by Lemma 4.
. Hence, the budget of agent 1 has to be large enough, such that b 1 ≥ v 2,2 v 2,1 −v 2,1 v 2,2 v 2,2 −v 2,2
= v 2,1 β+v 2,2 α β > v 2,1 + v 2,2 , but b 1 < v 2,1 + v 2,2 holds by assumption. Contradiction!
Randomized Mechanisms for Divisible and Indivisible Items
We exploit the fact that randomized mechanisms for both divisible and indivisible items are essentially equivalent to deterministic mechanisms for divisible items. We show that for agents with budget constraints every randomized mechanism M = (x,p) for divisible or indivisible items can be mapped bidirectionally to a deterministic mechanism M = (x, p) for divisible items with identical expected utility for all the agents and the auctioneer when the same reported types are used as input.
To turn a randomized mechanism for divisible or indivisible items into a deterministic mechanism for divisible items simply compute the expected values of p i and x i, j for all i and j and return them. To turn a deterministic mechanism for divisible items into a randomized mechanism for divisible or indivisible items simply assign the items with probability x i, j and keep the same payment as the deterministic mechanism.
PROPOSITION 4.7. Every randomized mechanismM = (x,p) for agents with finite budgets, a rational auctioneer, and a limited amount of divisible or indivisible items can be mapped bidirectionally to a deterministic mechanism M = (x, p) for divisible items such that u i (x i (θ ), p i (θ ), θ i ) = E [u i (x i (θ ),p i (θ ), θ i )] and i∈N p i (θ ) = E [ i∈Np i (θ )] for all agents i, all true types θ = (v, b), and reported types θ = (v , b ).
PROOF. Let us mapM = (x,p) to M = (x, p) that assigns for each agent i ∈ N and item j ∈ M a fraction of E [x i, j ] of item j to agent i, and makes each agent i ∈ N pay E [p i ]. The expectations exist since the feasible fractions of items and the feasible payments have an upper bound and a lower bound. For the other direction, we map M = (x, p) toM = (x,p) that randomly picks for each item j ∈ M an agent i ∈ N to which it assigns item j in a way such that agent i is picked with probability x i, j , and makes each agent i ∈ N pay p i . Since x = E [x] and p = E [p],
This proposition implies the nonexistence of randomized mechanisms stated in Theorem 4.8.
THEOREM 4.8. There can be no randomized mechanism for divisible or indivisible items that is IR ex interim, PO ex interim, and IC ex interim, and that satisfies the public budget constraint ex post.
PROOF. For a contradiction, suppose that there is such a randomized mechanism. Then, by Proposition 4.7, there must be a deterministic mechanism for divisible items and public budgets that satisfies IR, PO, and IC. This gives a contradiction to Theorem 4.6.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this article, we analyzed IR, PO, and IC mechanisms for settings with heterogeneous items. Our main accomplishments are (a) randomized mechanisms that achieve these properties for private budgets and a restricted class of additive valuations; and (b) an impossibility result for randomized mechanisms and public budgets for additive valuations. We are able to circumvent the impossibility result in the restricted setting because our argument for the impossibility result is based on the ability of an agent to overstate his valuation for one and understate his valuation for another item, which is not possible in the restricted setting. A promising direction for future work is to identify other valuations for which this is the case.
APPENDIXES

A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.1
We show the claim for the deterministic setting. The claim for the randomized setting follows by interpreting x i, j as the expected fraction of item j allocated to agent i, p i as agent i's expected payment, and u i as its expected utility.
First we show that if (x, p) satisfies PO, then it satisfies NT. To this end, we show that if (x, p) does not satisfy NT, then it is not PO.
Case 1: ¬ NT because ¬ (a). We can assign the unassigned fraction of the item j ∈ M for which i∈N x i, j < 1 to any agent i ∈ N to get a contradiction to PO.
Case 2: ¬ NT because ¬ (b). There exists an assignment x such that i∈N δ i v i > 0 and i∈W min(
For all agents i ∈ N, we have u i ≥ u i because
For the auctioneer we have i∈N p i ≥ i∈N p i because
For this agent i inequality (1) is strict showing that u i > u i . Hence, in both cases (x, p) is not PO.
Next, we show that if (x, p) satisfies NT, then it is PO. To this end, we show that if (x, p) is not PO, then it does not satisfy NT. If (x, p) is not PO, then there exists an outcome (x , p ) such that u i ≥ u i for all agents i ∈ N and i∈N p i ≥ i∈N p i , with at least one of the inequalities strict.
If not all items are assigned completely in (x, p), then we have ¬ (a) and so (x, p) does not satisfy NT. Otherwise, if in (x, p) all items are assigned completely, then to show that (x, p) does not satisfy NT we have to show ¬ (b). To this end, consider the assignment x and let
We begin by showing that i∈W min(
If u i > u i for some i ∈ N, then i∈N u i > i∈N u i and, thus, the first inequality in (3) is strict. Otherwise, if i∈N p i > i∈N p i , then the second inequality in (3) is strict. In both cases strictness of the inequality implies that i∈N δ i v i > 0.
B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.2
We begin by showing that if M satisfies VM and PI, then it satisfies IC. For a contradiction assume that M satisfies VM and PI, but that it does not satisfy IC. Then there exists i ∈ N,
If v i > v i , then since M satisfies VM and PI the utilities u i and u i that agent i gets from reports θ i and θ i satisfy
then since M satisfies VM and PI the utilities u i and u i that agent i gets from reports θ i and θ i satisfy
We conclude that in both cases agent i is weakly better off when he reports truthfully. This contradicts our assumption that M does not satisfy IC.
Next, we show that if M satisfies IC, then it satisfies VM. By contradiction assume that M satisfies IC, but that it does not satisfy VM. Then there exists
Since M satisfies IC, agent i with type θ i does not benefit from reporting θ i , and vice versa. Thus, j∈M
Since j∈M x i, j (θ i , θ −i )α j > j∈M x i, j (θ i , θ −i )α j this shows that v i ≥ v i and gives a contradiction to our assumption that v i < v i .
We conclude the proof by showing that if M satisfies IC, then it satisfies PI. For a contradiction assume that M satisfies IC, but that it does not satisfy PI. Then there exists i ∈ N,
where the γ s are the sum over the α's of all possible assignments in nonincreasing order and the c γ s (b i , θ −i ) are the smallest valuations (or critical valuations) that make agent i win γ s .
Consider the smallest v i such that this is the case. For this v i we must have
is the same and, thus, by IC he must face the same payment. We must have c γ t (b i , θ −i ) > c γ 0 (b i , θ −i ) = 0 because for v i = 0 we have p(θ i , θ −i ) = p((0, b i ), θ −i ) by definition.
Case 1:
. If agent i's type is θ i , then for the utilities u i and u i that he gets for reports θ i and θ i we have u
This shows that agent i with type θ i has an incentive to misreport his type as θ i and contradicts our assumption that M satisfies IC.
Case 2:
. If agent i's type is θ i , then for the utilities u i and u i that he gets from reports θ i and θ i we have u
We get u i − u i > 0. This shows that agent i with type θ i has an incentive to misreport his type as θ i and contradicts our assumption that M satisfies IC.
C. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.4
First suppose that the payments are deterministic. If p i > b i , thenp i > b i and
Next, suppose that the payments are randomized. If Pr[ p i > b i ] > 0, then
D. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.1
Fix i ∈ N and θ −i = (v −i , b −i ). By IC agent i does not benefit from reporting θ i = (v i , b i ) when his true type is θ i = (v i , b i ), nor does he benefit from reporting θ i = (v i , b i ) when his true type is
